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Abstract 
Thirty- and 36-month-old English speakers’ (N = 106) ability to produce jokes, 
distinguish between humorous and sincere intentions, and distinguish between 
English- and Foreign-language speakers, was examined in two tasks. In the Giving 
task, an experimenter requested one of two familiar objects, and a confederate always 
gave her the wrong object. In the Naming task, the confederate mislabeled familiar 
objects. In the English-speaking conditions, the confederate laughed after doing the 
wrong thing (English-Humor) or said, “There!” (English-Sincere). In the Foreign 
conditions, the French or Italian-speaking confederate laughed (Foreign-Humor) or 
said, “D’accord!” or “Va bene!” (Foreign-Sincere). When preschoolers were 
subsequently requested to give and name the same objects and a new set of familiar 
objects they were significantly more likely to imitate and “do the wrong thing” in the 
Humor versus Sincere, and in the English versus Foreign conditions.  
 
Keywords: Intentions, Humor, Imitation, Foreign languages, Trust, Creativity 
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 Preschoolers Joke with Jokers, but Correct Foreigners 
Children understand intentions from a young age. Infants complete others’ 
incomplete actions from 15 months (Meltzoff, 1995). From 14 months, they 
discriminate between incidental and intentional aspects of an action (Gergely, 
Bekkering, & Király, 2002). Infants can also differentiate intentional actions from 
mistakes from 14 months (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998). Most research on 
intention understanding compares whether children can tell the difference between 
intentional and unintentional actions. However very little research has examined 
whether young children understand different types of intentions. For example, people 
can intend to be sincere, or they can intend to joke. People can also be mistaken 
because they do not speak or understand the language being used. The current study 
examines whether preschoolers can differentiate between humorous and sincere 
intentions, and between native and foreign speakers. 
By 2 years, toddlers begin to understand not only that people can intend to do 
the right thing, but also that people can intend to do the wrong thing. Hoicka and 
Gattis (2008) found that from 2 years toddlers will copy wrong actions accompanied 
by laughter, but correct the same wrong actions accompanied by the expression 
“Whoops!” Rakoczy, Tomasello, and Striano (2004) found that 36-month-olds will 
copy technically wrong pretend actions marked with laughter amongst other cues, but 
will correct the same wrong actions when marked by trying-but-failing cues (e.g., 
grunting).  
However, intentional actions were cued with positive expressions in studies 
examining intentional versus unintentional actions (e.g., “There!” in Carpenter, et al., 
1998; laughter in Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Rakoczy et al., 2004), while unintentional 
actions were cued by negative expressions (“Whoops!” in Carpenter, et al., 1998; 
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Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; grunting in Rakoczy et al., 2004). Thus it is possible that 
infants and toddlers responded to emotion cues rather than the underlying intentions. 
Therefore children may have copied actions associated with positive emotions and 
avoided or corrected actions associated with negative emotions. Consequently, it is 
important to examine whether children can distinguish between intentions that are 
accompanied by similar emotion cues. 
Recent research suggests that 15-month-old infants can distinguish between 
two different types of positive intentional acts. Infants were shown sweet actions (e.g., 
stroking a toy cat) as well as humorous actions (e.g., stroking one’s head with a toy 
cat) accompanied by matching or mismatching vocal cues (Hoicka & Wang, 2010). 
The infants looked longer when the cues mismatched the actions than when they 
matched, indicating that they were sensitive to the mismatch. Thus specific cues (in 
particular, laughter and humorous intonation) led infants to expect humor, while 
equally positive sweet cues (saying “Awww” and sweet intonation) led infants to 
expect sweet (but non-humorous) actions. The findings suggest that 15-month-olds 
distinguish between humorous and sweet cues, and match them appropriately to 
humorous and sweet actions. 
One goal of the current study was to examine whether preschoolers distinguish 
between different intentions that all involve positive emotion. Intentional actions 
typically involve doing the right thing. However humorous intentional actions often 
involve doing the wrong thing (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka, Jutsum, & Gattis, 
2008; Leekam, 1991). As such, humor provides an ideal way to compare various 
intentions that involve positive emotions. In the case of labeling, one could 
intentionally mislabel an object because one is making a joke. Thus the joker would 
have intended to do the wrong thing, and would have fulfilled that intention. 
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A second goal was to examine whether children can discriminate between 
native and foreign speakers, and understand that it is incorrect to use a foreign 
language in an English-speaking context. In contrast to joking, someone might 
mislabel objects in an English-speaking context because she genuinely does not know 
the correct label in English. Thus while the (mis)labeling is an intentional act, it 
results in doing the wrong thing. There is evidence that young children can distinguish 
between native and foreign speakers. For example, 6-month-olds preferred to look at 
people who spoke their own language versus another language, and 5-year-olds 
preferred to befriend people who spoke their own language versus another language 
(Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). Additionally, 3- and 4-year-olds are more likely 
to learn novel words from an English speaker versus a foreign-language speaker 
(Akhtar, Menjivar, Hoicka, & Sabbagh, 2010). Furthermore, preschoolers selectively 
imitate the actions of native versus foreign-accented speakers (Kinzler, Corriveau, & 
Harris, in press). One reason that children might be less likely to copy the behaviors 
of a foreigner is that they may not trust them, as they could be seen as generally 
inaccurate speakers. Indeed, 3- and 4-year-olds are less likely to trust inaccurate 
versus accurate speakers when learning new labels (Koenig & Harris, 2005). 
A third goal was to determine whether toddlers can be innovative and produce 
their own jokes. Past research suggests that young children do produce jokes. For 
example, Hoicka and Gattis (2008) found that from 19 months, children will copy 
incongruous actions (e.g., putting a boot on one’s hand) accompanied by laughter. 
Observational studies have described several types of humor that individual children 
have produced, such as mislabeling objects or making up silly words (e.g., Hoicka & 
Akhtar, 2010; Johnson & Mervis, 1997), or performing incongruous actions such as 
bending over and putting one’s head through one’s legs, or brushing a pot (e.g., 
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Hoicka & Akhtar, 2010; Loizou, 2005). Parents report that from 8 months infants will 
repeat incongruous actions when others laugh (Reddy, 2001). However, it is possible 
that children in these studies simply mimic or repeat particular actions and utterances 
in order to get a response (e.g., laughter). This would not necessarily require children 
to understand that what makes a joke funny is incongruity (e.g., McGhee, 1979; 
Shultz, 1974), that is, something unexpected or out of the ordinary. In order to 
determine whether young children appreciate incongruity as humorous, and to 
determine whether young children can create their own jokes, experimental methods 
are required. To date, there have been no experimental studies to test whether young 
children can create novel jokes. In the current studies, we tested not only whether 
children would copy specific joke tokens, but also whether children would create their 
own novel joke tokens. 
In the current study, we compared children’s responses to adults who all 
deliberately “did the wrong thing” (gave the wrong object, or mislabeled an object) in 
a positive manner. There are different reasons why an adult might do the wrong thing. 
One could be that they are joking (cued by laughter versus a sincere expression). 
Another could be that they do not speak the language (cued by speaking a foreign 
language versus English). We employed a 2 (Humorous, Sincere) X 2 (Foreign, 
English) design to examine whether children would be more likely to do the wrong 
thing (give the wrong object, say the wrong label) in the presence of cues that the 
speaker/actor was a foreigner and/or was intending to be humorous. 
It is possible that children in past studies (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 1998; Hoicka 
& Gattis, 2008; Rakoczy, et al., 2004) responded to emotional valence only, without 
understanding underlying intentions. Thus we might expect children in the current 
study to do the wrong thing equally often across conditions, as all conditions in the 
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current study are cued with positive emotion. However children in past studies may 
have indeed been sensitive to intentions, not just emotion. Thus we might expect 
children in the current study to be sensitive to humorous intentions and understand 
that it is funny to purposefully do the wrong thing. They may also understand that it 
makes no sense to do the wrong thing in the sincere conditions. If this is the case, 
children should do the wrong thing in the two Humor conditions, but not in the two 
Sincere conditions.  
Likewise, if children respond to the confederate’s language, they should be 
more likely to correct the confederate in the Foreign versus English conditions. This is 
because foreign-language speakers violate English-language conventions, and may 
appear to be ignorant and hence not trustworthy. Overall, we might expect children to 
do the wrong thing most often in the English-Humor condition, least often in the 
Foreign-Sincere condition, and somewhere in between in the English-Sincere and 
Foreign-Humor conditions.  
In the Giving task, 30- and 36-month-olds watched an experimenter ask a 
confederate for one (e.g., car) of two known objects (e.g., car, book). The confederate 
always gave the incorrect object to the experimenter (in this case, the book). In the 
Naming task, children watched the experimenter ask the confederate to label familiar 
objects (e.g., duck). The confederate always mislabeled the object with a silly (made-
up) word (e.g., Boody doody). After having a chance to copy or correct the 
confederate’s actions/ utterances, children were asked to give/label a new set of 
familiar objects. This allowed us to examine whether children would continue to do 
the wrong thing in the Humor versus Sincere conditions, demonstrating that (1) 
children were not simply mimicking the confederate, but instead understood that she 
was intending to be humorous, and (2) they were able to create their own novel jokes.  
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We tested 30- and 36-month-olds because 2-year-olds are theorized to enjoy 
jokes based on mislabeling (McGhee, 1979), and 3-year-olds are theorized to make 
jokes that play with concepts (McGhee, 1979) including nonsense language, e.g., 
saying, “gobbledygook” (Johnson & Mervis, 1997). Indeed, Hoicka and Akhtar 
(2010) found, through parent interviews and observation of parent-child dyads, that 2- 
and 3-year-olds do produce such jokes to some extent. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twelve children participated. Six children were not included 
because they did not speak English (2), did not respond on any trial (2) or responded 
in only one block of trials throughout the entire study (2). Of the remaining 106 
children, 27 were assigned to the English-Humor condition (15 boys; 13 were 30 
months, M = 29 months, 25 days, SD = 20 days; 14 were 36 months, M = 36 months, 
1 day, SD = 23 days), 27 to the English-Sincere condition (12 boys; 12 were 30 
months, M = 29 months, 26 days, SD = 19 days; 15 were 36 months, M = 35 months, 
24 days, SD = 20 days), 25 to the Foreign-Humor condition (10 boys; 12 were 30 
months, M = 29 months, 28 days, SD = 22 days; 13 were 36 months, M = 36 months, 
4 days, SD = 20 days), and 27 to the Foreign-Sincere condition (12 boys; 13 were 30 
months, M = 29 months, 28 days, SD = 20 days; 14 were 36 months, M = 36 months, 
4 days, SD = 23 days). Children were tested in California or Scotland. One child was 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 89 children were Caucasian, two were Hispanic, 10 were of 
mixed ethnicity, and four parents did not report their child’s ethnicity. Children were 
recruited from a press release in a local newspaper, music and gymnastic classes, 
children’s fairs, and libraries. Two of the 106 children did not participate in the 
Giving task. Twenty-five of the 106 children did not participate in the Naming task. A 
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mixed logit model (explained later) looking at whether or not children participated in 
the Naming task was not affected by Intention, Language, Age, Gender, Task Order, 
or the number of task object words produced, as reported by parents.  
Materials 
Materials for the Giving task included 12 pairs of familiar objects, e.g., car, 
book; pizza, toothbrush (see Appendix A for full list). Materials for the Naming task 
included 12 different familiar objects, e.g., duck, cup, elephant, hairbrush (see 
Appendix B for full list). Objects were chosen for which 90% of 30-month-olds 
should know the labels according to the MacArthur-Bates Child Development 
Inventories (MB-CDI, Dale & Fenson, 1996). Parents reported that the 104 children 
who participated in the Giving task understood on average 23.89 out of 24 words 
(99.54%). Parents reported that the 81 children who participated in the Naming task 
could produce 11.49 out of the 12 words on average (95.75%). A Sony digital DV 
camcorder, and a wall-mounted microphone were used to record the sessions.  
Design 
The study consisted of a 2 (Language: English, Foreign) X 2 (Intention: 
Sincere, Humorous) between-subjects design. The confederate spoke English in the 
warm-up in the English conditions, and French or Italian in the Foreign conditions. 
The confederate laughed after giving the wrong object (Giving) or saying the wrong 
label (Naming) in the Humorous conditions, and said either “There!” (English-
Sincere) or “D’accord!” or “Va bene!” (Foreign-Sincere) while smiling in the Sincere 
conditions. The dependent measures were whether children gave the correct or 
incorrect object on each trial (Giving), and whether children labeled objects correctly 
or incorrectly on each trial (Naming). Order of task (Giving, Naming) was 
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counterbalanced such that half the children in each condition received the Giving task 
first. 
For the Giving task, two sets of six pairs of familiar objects were 
counterbalanced such that half of the children saw the confederate model objects from 
Set 1, while the other half saw the confederate model objects from Set 2 (see 
Appendix A). The experimenter asked the confederate, and later child, for the first 
object of each pair (e.g., asked for the car from the car/book pair) for half the children, 
and asked for the second object of each pair (e.g., asked for the book from the 
car/book pair) for the other half. Placement of objects (left or right) was 
counterbalanced within and across children and across conditions. Pairs of objects 
were used in a fixed order (see Appendix A). 
For the Naming task, two sets of six individual familiar objects were 
counterbalanced such that half of the children saw the confederate label objects from 
Set 1, while the other half saw the confederate label objects from Set 2 (see Appendix 
B).  
Procedure 
To warm up, the experimenter, confederate, and child engaged in a 5- to 10-
minute free play session until the child was comfortable interacting with the 
experimenter and confederate. In the English conditions, the experimenter and 
confederate both spoke English during the warm-up, but neither the experimenter nor 
the confederate labeled any objects, referring to them as “that one” or “him”, and so 
on. In the Foreign conditions, the confederate spoke French or Italian, and the 
experimenter spoke English but did not label any objects. While children did not 
generally make verbal requests, the experimenter and confederate avoided responding 
to verbal requests and instead tried to follow the children’s physical actions. For 
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example, if a child put an animal in a barn, the experimenter or confederate did as 
well. While some children in the Foreign conditions preferred to play with the 
experimenter, perhaps avoiding the confederate because of the language she spoke, 
other children interacted well with the confederate, seemingly not noticing the 
language barrier.  
One of four scripts was used by the experimenter and confederate before 
beginning the session in order to communicate that they were making jokes or playing 
a game (see Appendix C). For example, in the Humor-English condition, the 
experimenter (E) and confederate (C) said the following: 
E: You know, [confederate] is really funny. 
C: I love to be silly! 
E: How about we make some jokes! I’ll ask you for some things and you two 
can be silly. 
Giving Task 
The experimenter placed a pair of objects (e.g., a car and a book) in front of 
the confederate and asked, “Do you want to give me the [object label] (e.g., car)?” 
This wording was used instead of, “Can you give me the [object label]?” as it 
permitted the children to give the wrong object if desired when it was their turn. The 
confederate always gave the incorrect object (in this case, the book). In the Humor 
conditions, the confederate then laughed and looked to the child’s face, followed by 
the experimenter and the child’s parent also laughing and looking to the child’s face. 
In the Sincere conditions, the confederate said “D’accord!” or “Va bene!” (Foreign-
Sincere) or “There!” (English-Sincere), smiled, and looked to the child’s face, after 
which the experimenter said “Alright!” smiled and looked to the child’s face, and the 
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parent said, “OK!” smiled and looked to the child’s face. The same pattern followed 
for an additional five pairs of objects.  
Identical trials. Each child received six trials with the same objects the 
confederate had seen. The experimenter set out the pairs of objects in the same order 
for the child (one pair at a time), and requested the same objects as requested from the 
confederate (although the left/right placement of objects was varied). When the child 
gave an object, the experimenter said. “OK” followed by a slight laugh. If the 
experimenter had not laughed when the child attempted a joke, the absence of 
laughter could have served as feedback, stopping the child from joking. However the 
feedback needed to be consistent regardless of condition or response, so the 
experimenter gave a slight laugh in all conditions and for all responses. This could be 
interpreted as humor appreciation or general jolliness, making the response 
appropriate either for a joking or a general play event. If the child did not give an 
object, the experimenter requested the object again. If the child still did not give an 
object, the experimenter went on to the next pair of objects. 
Extension trials. The experimenter then brought out six additional pairs of 
familiar objects that had not been seen previously. The experimenter continued to 
request one of two objects, and gave the same feedback as previously. 
Naming Task 
The experimenter held up an object and asked the confederate, “What do you 
want to call this?” The confederate always answered with a made-up label, in all 
conditions (e.g., Boody doody; Oogle boo, see Appendix B). The confederate, 
experimenter and parent then all gave the same cues by condition as in the Giving 
task. This was repeated for an additional five objects.  
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Identical trials. The experimenter then set out the same objects for the child 
(one at a time), and asked the child, “What do you want to call this?” This wording 
was used instead of, “What do you call this?” or “What is this called?” as it permitted 
the child to produce an incorrect label if desired. When the child responded, the 
experimenter responded as in the Giving task by saying “OK” followed by a slight 
laugh, or repeating the question if the child did not respond.  
Extension trials. The experimenter then brought out a new set of six familiar 
objects for the extension trials. The experimenter continued to ask the child, “What do 
you want to call this?” and gave the same feedback as previously. 
Coding 
For the Giving task, actions were coded from video by coders blind to the 
hypotheses as (1) correct (child gave the requested object); (2) incorrect (child gave 
the non-requested object); or (3) non-response (gives neither, or both at same time). 
For example, if the experimenter set out a car and a book and requested the car, the 
child’s response was coded as correct if she gave the car, and incorrect if she gave the 
book. If the child gave one object, then another (whether immediately or later), the 
first object was coded. Twenty-two of the 104 videos (21.15%) were coded for 
agreement. Cohen’s kappa was excellent, k = .94. 
For the Naming task, labels for each object were transcribed from video. 
Labels were coded as (1) correct (child produced the correct label, e.g., “duck” for 
duck); (2) incorrect (child produced the incorrect label, e.g., “Boody doody”, or “cup” 
for duck; see Appendix D for details of coding scheme); or (3) no response (child said 
nothing, “I don’t know”; “Yeah”; “No”; etc.). Twenty-two of the 89 videos (24.72%) 
were coded for agreement. Cohen’s kappa was very good, k = .89. A qualitative 
analysis examined the types of incorrect labels used by the children in the English-
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Humor condition. This involved classifying incorrect labels as nonsense language 
(e.g., “mooka” instead of “spoon”), wrong words (e.g., “dog” instead of “spoon”), or 
a play on the actual word (e.g., “spoony spoon spoon” instead of “spoon”). 
In order to examine whether children appreciated that the confederate was 
joking in the Humor conditions, we also examined whether children laughed at some 
point during each trial. We expected them to laugh more often in the Humor 
conditions than in the Sincere conditions, and more often when they gave incorrect 
objects (Giving) and produced incorrect labels (Naming) than when they gave the 
requested objects and labeled correctly. We coded whether or not children laughed (1) 
each time the confederate did something wrong, and (2) each time the child responded 
during the identical and extension trials. Eighteen of the 106 videos (16.98%) were 
coded for agreement. Cohen’s kappa was good, k = .780. For disagreements on all 
coding, we followed the coding of the primary coder. 
Results 
We modeled the likelihood of making incorrect responses using logit mixed 
effects models with the LME4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Dai, 2008) in R (R 
Development Core Team, 2009). It has been the convention to use ANOVA for 
collapsed data across trials, and ANOVA has been used in similar studies (e.g., 
Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Meltzoff, 1995; Rakoczy, et al., 2004). However Jaeger 
(2008) has recently argued that it is more appropriate to analyze this type of data with 
logit mixed effects models, as the children’s responses are repeated-measures 
categorical data points, not continuous data points. Thus, just as one would use a chi-
square analysis instead of a t-test when the variable is categorical rather than 
continuous, the same can be done for repeated-measures variables. Jaeger (2008) 
demonstrates that ANOVAs on this type of data can lead to spurious results through 
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over-fitting, while logit mixed effects models avoid this. Additionally logit mixed 
effects models use all raw data instead of collapsed data, giving the models more 
power. ANOVAs on each child’s percentage of incorrect responses can be found in 
Appendix E. Comparing this to the following mixed logit models, it can be seen that 
most of the main results are the same. However the mixed logit models also capture 
an effect of Language in the Giving task, perhaps revealed through taking account of 
other variables not measurable in the ANOVA such as Trial Number, as well as the 
increased power offered by using raw data instead of collapsed data. 
For each analysis (Giving, Naming, Laughter), we first built a base model, 
which included an intercept, and Participant and Items (1-12 from both sets of items 
for each of the Giving and Naming tasks) as random variables. We compared the base 
model to models including Intention (Humor, Sincere), Language (English, Foreign), 
Trial Type (Identical, Extension), Age, Gender, Task Order (Giving or Naming task 
first) and Trial Number (earlier versus later trials) all with df = 1. If one of these 
models was a significant improvement over the base model (using chi-square 
analyses), the variable was added to the base model. Otherwise the base model was 
not changed. If more than one variable was a significant improvement over the base 
model, the model which had the lowest log-likelihood was used as the model, and we 
then checked whether the remaining variables improved this new model in the same 
way. We also tested whether interactions of variables with each condition, and 
response in the laughter analysis, significantly improved the latest model in the same 
way. Once there were no improvements to the model where df = 1, we looked for 
improvements where df = 2. For example, if Intention (Humor, Sincere) was in the 
model, but Gender was not, then looking at an interaction between Intention and 
Gender would be df = 2 (Gender; Gender X Intention). When the best df  = 2 
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interaction was found, we again tested whether variables and interactions with df = 1 
improved the model, and repeated the cycle. If interactions with df = 2 did not 
improve the model, then we examined whether interactions with df = 3 improved the 
model. For example, if neither Intention nor Gender were in the best model, 
examining an interaction between Intention and Gender would have df = 3 (Intention; 
Gender; Intention X Gender). When the best df  = 3 interaction was found, we again 
tested whether variables and interactions with df = 1 improved the model, and 
repeated the cycle. If interactions with df = 3 did not improve the model, then the 
best-fit model had been found. When the final best-fit model was found, the logit 
mixed effects model determined which variables and interactions had significant 
effects on the children’s responses, and returned an odds-ratios (OR) which describes 
whether certain variables and interactions make the target response proportionally 
more or less likely.  
Giving Task 
See the left half of Figure 1 for the percentage of trials on which children gave 
incorrect objects in the Giving task, by Condition. The base model was improved by 
adding Intention (Humor, Sincere), X2(1) = 4.51, p = .0338, and an interaction of 
Language (English, Foreign) and Trial Order, X2(3) = 9.87, p = .0197, as fixed effects. 
The resulting model (log-likelihood = -538.05, N = 1148) included significant effects 
of Intention (Humor vs. Sincere, OR = 2.35, p = .0288), Language (English vs. 
Foreign, OR = 179.59, p = .0236), Trial Order (OR = 1.20, p = .0053), and an 
interaction between Language and Trial Order (OR = 1.27, p = .0115). Thus children 
in the Humor conditions were more than twice as likely to give an incorrect object as 
children in the Sincere conditions. Children in the Foreign conditions were 180 times 
as likely to give the correct object as children in the English conditions. Children were 
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20 percent more likely to give the wrong object during later versus earlier trials. 
Finally, children were 27 percent more likely to give the correct versus incorrect 
object on later trials during the Foreign versus English conditions. No other effects 
were found. 
Naming Task 
See the right half of Figure 1 for the percentage of trials on which children 
produced incorrect labels in the Naming task, by Condition. The base model was 
improved by adding Trial Type (Identical, Extension), X2(1) = 6.09, p = .0136, then 
Order (Giving or Naming first), X2(1) = 6.01, p = .0142, then Language (English, 
Foreign), X2(1) = 4.79, p = .0286, then Intention (Humor, Sincere), X2(1) = 4.05, p = 
.0441 as fixed effects. The resulting model (log-likelihood = -341.5, N = 813) 
included significant effects of Intention (Humor vs. Sincere, OR = 3.70, p = .0383), 
Language (English vs. Foreign, OR = 4.00, p = .0314), Trial Type (Identical vs. 
Extension, OR = 1.76, p = .0106), and Order (Giving or Naming first, OR = 0.22, p = 
.0161). Thus children in the Humor conditions were almost 4 times as likely to label 
objects incorrectly as children in the Sincere conditions. Children in the English 
conditions were 4 times as likely to label objects incorrectly as children in the Foreign 
conditions. Children were almost twice as likely to label objects incorrectly during the 
Identical versus Extension Trials. Finally, children were about a fifth as likely to label 
objects incorrectly when they did the Giving task before the Naming task. No other 
effects were found. 
Types of Incorrect Labels in the English-Humor Condition 
From a total of 110 incorrect labels generated in the English-Humor condition, 
none were exactly the same as those produced by the confederate. Seventy-eight 
(71%) were in the form of nonsense words, for example, a duck was called, “colgai”, 
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a diaper was called, “wooga”, and a cup was called, “goojooboojoo”. Twenty-one 
(19%) of the incorrect labels involved calling objects the incorrect name, e.g., a watch 
was called “diaper”, and a brush was called “spider monster”. Finally, 11 (10%) of the 
incorrect labels involved playing with the actual label by repeating the label, adding 
nonsense syllables or irrelevant words, or rhyming the real labels with silly labels. For 
example, a block was called, “blocky block”, while a baby doll was called, “baby 
daby”. 
Laughter 
Secondary analyses examined (1) whether children laughed more often when 
the confederate did the wrong thing in the Humor versus Sincere conditions, which 
reveals whether children were processing the confederate’s behavior as joking, and 
(2) whether children laughed more often when doing the wrong thing versus doing the 
right thing, which reveals whether children were appreciating and/or cuing their own 
jokes. Since laughter was a somewhat rare event, we collapsed data across the Giving 
and Naming tasks for these analyses. One child’s data could not be coded for laughter 
as her face could not be seen. 
Laughter: Modeled trials. 
See Figure 2 for the percentage of Modeling trials during which children 
laughed, by Intention (Humor, Sincere) and Age. A logit mixed effects model was 
built as before, however there were 24 items included in the random effects rather 
than 12 since both the Giving and Naming tasks were included. Additionally, we 
investigated fixed effects of Task (Giving, Naming) and its interaction with 
Condition. The dependent measure was whether or not children laughed. The base 
model was improved by adding Intention (Humor, Sincere), X2(1) = 22.70, p < .0001, 
then Trial Number, X2(1) = 14.33, p = .0002, then Task, X2(1) = 9.43, p = .0021, then 
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Age, X2(1) = 6.16, p = .0131, and finally an interaction between Intention (Humor, 
Sincere) and Age, X2(1) = 4.40, p = .0360 as fixed effects. The resulting model (log 
likelihood = -284.46, N = 1248) included significant effects of Trial Number (OR = 
1.42, p < .0001), and Task (Giving, Naming, OR = 2.19, p = .0019), and a trend for an 
interaction between Intention (Humor, Sincere) and Age (OR = 1.71, p = .0931). Thus 
children were more than twice as likely to laugh in the Naming task than in the Giving 
task. Children were almost fifty percent more likely to laugh on later versus earlier 
trials. Finally, a trend suggests that older children were more than seventy percent 
more likely to laugh in the Humor versus Sincere conditions as younger children. No 
other effects were found. 
Laughter by response type. 
See Figure 3 for the percentage of Identical and Extension trials during which 
children laughed, by Response and Age. A logit mixed effects model was built as for 
the Modeling trials, however we included children’s Response Type (Correct, 
Incorrect) as a variable, as well as Trial Type (Identical, Extension). The base model 
was improved by adding Response Type, X2(1) = 7.22, p = .0072, then an interaction 
between Response Type and Age, X2(2) = 16.51, p = .0003, then an interaction 
between Response Type and Task (Giving, Naming), X2(2) = 11.51, p = .0032, then 
an interaction between Intention (Humor, Sincere) and Task, X2(2) = 13.63, p = .0011, 
then an interaction between Intention (Humor, Sincere) and Trial Type, X2(2) = 6.32, 
p = .0425  and finally an interaction between Intention (Humor, Sincere) and 
Response Type, X2(1) = 11.75, p = .0006 as fixed effects. The resulting model (log 
likelihood = -181.59, N = 1937) included a significant interaction between Response 
Type and Age (OR = 1.77, p = .0006). Thus older children were almost twice as likely 
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to laugh when giving an incorrect versus correct response than younger children. No 
other reliable effects were found. 
Discussion 
The results suggest that children are sensitive to (1) humorous versus sincere 
intentions, and (2) English versus foreign languages. Additionally, they suggest that 
children can create their own novel jokes. During the Giving task, children were 
significantly more likely to give the wrong object in the humorous conditions, even 
during the extension trials, in which the confederate had not modeled the actions. 
Likewise, during the Naming task, children were significantly more likely to produce 
an incorrect label in the humorous conditions, even during the extension trials. 
Children were significantly less likely to give an incorrect object and to produce an 
incorrect label when the confederate spoke a foreign language. 
Understanding Different Types of Intentions 
One important aspect of the design of this study was that all contexts were 
emotionally positive, but involved different intentions - intentions to do the wrong 
thing (Humor) versus intentions to do the right thing (Sincere). In past studies (e.g., 
Carpenter, et al., 1998; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Rakoczy, et al., 2004), all intentional 
actions, including pretense and humor, involved positive emotional displays, while 
mistakes and trying involved negative emotional displays. Thus, one possibility is that 
the children in these studies were not in fact discerning others’ intentions. Rather, 
they may have copied behaviors when the demonstrator was positive, and avoided or 
corrected behaviors when the demonstrator was negative. Another possibility is that 
children really did respond to the underlying intentions (e.g., as in Hoicka & Wang, 
2010), as the intentional cues in these studies matched the action types modeled. The 
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current findings suggest that preschoolers respond to underlying intentions rather than 
emotions only, and can also differentiate between different types of intentions. 
A limitation of the current study is that laughter is more intense than the 
expressions, “There!”  “D’accord!” and “Va bene!” accompanied by smiling. Thus 
children might copy actions marked with high intensity positive emotions, and avoid 
those marked with low intensity. However expressions such as “There!” encourage 
copying in other studies (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 1998). Thus children might follow a 
set of behavioral rules: (1) for novel acts with low intensity positive emotion, copy; 
(2) for wrong acts with low intensity positive emotion, correct; (3) for novel acts  with 
high intensity positive emotion, copy. Future research should compare positive 
intentional cues matched for intensity to rule out this possibility. 
Another question remains as to whether laughter alone cues humor, or whether 
the social setting is also important. In the humor conditions, the experimenter, 
confederate, and parent all laughed. While children as young as 19 months will copy 
wrong actions when the experimenter, and the experimenter alone, laughs (Hoicka & 
Gattis, 2008), other studies suggest that the presence of a laughing audience plays a 
role in children’s appreciation of humor. For example, 7- and 8-year-olds judge 
materials as funnier when other people are present (Chapman, 1975).  Young children 
may also better trust that the intention was to joke when parents were willing to laugh. 
Infants are more likely to laugh when mothers, versus strangers, produce jokes 
involving putting on masks, and peek-a-boo (MacDonald & Silverman, 1978; Waters, 
Matas, & Sroufe, 1975). Future research should explore the social factors that 
influence children’s ability to infer humorous intentions. 
Children in the Foreign-language conditions were more likely to correct the 
confederate in the Giving and Naming tasks. Children may have thought that the 
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Foreign-language speaker intended to say the right thing, but did not know how. Thus 
children may have corrected the Foreign-language speaking confederate because they 
were trying to match her intention – to do the right thing. In contrast, children may 
have thought that the English-speaking confederate should know the correct labels, 
and hence had intended to say the wrong thing. Thus children may have been more 
likely to mislabel during the English conditions because children might have tried to 
match their intentions to that of the confederate – to do the wrong thing. 
A further consideration is that children may have thought the confederate in 
the Sincere conditions was lying rather than being sincere. Thus it is possible that 
children did not differentiate intentions to do the right thing from intentions to do the 
wrong thing, but instead differentiated two types of intentions to do the wrong thing. 
This should theoretically be more difficult to do, and past research suggests that 
children cannot differentiate jokes from lies, albeit in a much more verbal form, until 
they understand false belief, at around 4 to 5 years (Leekam, 1991). Future research 
should examine whether preschoolers differentiate intentions to joke, lie, and be 
sincere. 
Trust 
Another way to interpret these results is through the framework of trust as 
young children often do not trust people who do the wrong thing (Koenig & Harris, 
2005), prefer people who speak their own language over people who speak a different 
language (Kinzler, et al., 2007), and selectively imitate the actions of native over 
foreign-accented speakers (Kinzler, et al., in press). Again, this may reflect the fact 
that children do not trust information coming from someone who says the wrong 
thing, or says it in the wrong way. In the context of speaking English, speaking 
French or Italian might appear to be wrong. However, the current findings suggest 
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that there is one context in which children will trust others who do the wrong thing; in 
a humorous context, children understand that incorrect actions can sometimes be 
performed intentionally (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). 
We suggest that children in the Humor conditions were more likely to copy 
and extend incorrect actions and labels because they understood that in a humorous 
context (i.e., when a joker is intentionally doing the wrong thing), it is appropriate to 
do the wrong thing themselves. However in the Sincere conditions, since the 
confederate gave cues that she intended to do the right thing, children may have seen 
her as an inaccurate labeler, and hence did not trust, and did not copy her wrong 
actions. Finally, in the Foreign conditions, children may have thought that the 
foreigner was an inaccurate labeler, and hence should not be trusted, nor copied. 
Thus, a key to whether children are willing to trust a wrong-doer may be whether or 
not the wrong-doer intended to do the wrong thing. If someone gives cues that they 
intended to do the right thing, but did the wrong thing instead, children may see the 
action either as a mistake or based in ignorance, as children are aware that people do 
the wrong thing for these reasons (e.g., Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Koenig & Harris, 
2005). Thus intentional cues on their own may not be enough for a child to copy an 
action. Rather, it may be the combination of intentional cues and whether the 
intentional cues match that person’s actions or utterances which influence a child’s 
willingness to do the wrong thing. 
Creating Novel Jokes 
Children differentiated conditions in the same way for both identical and 
extension trials in both the Giving and Naming tasks, suggesting they coordinated 
their actions with the context of the game, rather than the individual actions of the 
confederate. Thus preschoolers were not simply matching humorous intentional cues 
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to particular actions or utterances, but actually understood the nature of what made the 
actions humorous: that they involved giving the incorrect object, or producing an 
incorrect label. Thus, preschoolers could create joke tokens that they had never seen 
following a specific joke type they observed (give the wrong thing/say the wrong 
thing). Indeed, when children in the English-Humor condition generated incorrect 
labels for the objects, either in the Identical or Extension trials, they always made up 
novel incorrect labels for the objects. This reveals that they understood the 
incongruity inherent to the jokes, and also demonstrates that preschoolers can be 
creative when being humorous.  
These are the first experimental studies to show that preschoolers can create 
their own jokes, demonstrating an ability to innovate. While much observational and 
interview-based research has suggested that toddlers and even infants can do this 
(e.g., Hoicka & Akhtar, 2010; Johnson & Mervis, 1997; Loizou, 2005; Reddy, 2001), 
such research could be biased by parents’ or researchers’ interpretations of infants’ 
and toddlers’ intentions as humorous. It is possible that young children were simply 
mimicking or repeating actions or utterances that appeared to be jokes because they 
got a positive response for doing so. But this does not necessitate that children 
understood that what they were doing was incongruous, and that incongruity is what 
makes things funny. The current research suggests that from at least 30 months 
preschoolers do attend to specific types of incongruity (giving the wrong object, 
uttering an incorrect label for an object) and use them to form their own jokes. As 
they had seen the confederate give incorrect objects and mislabel objects, it could be 
said that children were simply following a script to do similar things rather than being 
creative. However identifying that script involved identifying types of incongruities. 
Additionally, following the script in the Extension trials required children to apply the 
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script in ways they had never seen anyone else apply the script, which is a creative 
act. Indeed, in the case of mislabeling objects, the children created jokes that no one 
else has probably ever made, for example, calling a cup, “goojooboojoo”. Thus from 
30 months, preschoolers can create their own joke tokens based on joke types that 
they have seen modeled. 
Laughter 
Children were more likely to laugh during modeling trials on the Naming 
versus Giving task. This suggests children found the Naming task to be funnier. 
Additionally, children were more likely to laugh during later versus earlier modeling 
trials, suggesting that as children saw more examples of the same type of wrong 
action, children perhaps “got it” and found it funny. Older children were more likely 
to laugh when they did the wrong thing compared to younger children. This suggests 
that when older children performed a wrong act, they did so because they thought it 
was funny, and were either laughing at their own jokes, or cuing others to their jokes. 
Indeed, children laugh twice as much when joking versus not joking (Hoicka & 
Akhtar, 2010), and laugh more often when an act is an intentional joke, versus an 
incidental incongruity (Bainum, Lounsbury, & Pollio, 1984). This suggests a richer 
interpretation that children, at least the 36-month-olds, understood that they were 
joking, and not simply following the rules of the game.  
Conclusions 
The current findings reveal that preschoolers understand that people can 
intend to do the wrong thing in order to be funny. In order to do this, they needed to 
distinguish intentions to do the wrong thing from intentions to do the right thing, all 
expressed along the same (positive) emotional spectrum. Thus preschoolers 
understand that people have different types of positive intentions. Additionally, we 
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found that preschoolers can create their own jokes, revealing their creativity, as well 
as a deeper understanding of what makes a joke funny. Finally, the findings also 
suggest that English-speaking preschoolers understand that when a foreign language 
speaker says or does the wrong thing, it is different from when a native English 
speaker does so. Thus children use a variety of cues and contexts in order to 
determine when it is appropriate to do the right thing, or do the wrong thing. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Percentage of all children’s incorrect responses by Condition and Task. 
Figure 2. Percentage of all modeling trials during which children laughed by Intention 
(Humor, Sincere) and Age. 
Figure 3. Percentage of all identical and extension trials during which children 
laughed by Response Type (Incorrect, Correct) and Age.
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Appendix A 
Object pairs used in Giving task. 
Set 1: 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Pair 1 Book Car 
Pair 2 Boat Ball 
Pair 3 Pizza Toothbrush 
Pair 4 Bowl  Apple 
Pair 5 Fish Sock 
Pair 6 Hat Horse 
 
Set 2: 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Pair 1 Bottle Pencil 
Pair 2 Balloon Fork 
Pair 3 Cat Shirt 
Pair 4 Pants (Trousers) Dog 
Pair 5 Bear Keys 
Pair 6 Plate Pig 
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Appendix B 
Objects used in Naming task, and the confederate’s (incorrect) labels of the 
objects. 
Set 1 Set 2 Confederate’s Label 
Elephant Duck Boody doody 
Diaper (Nappy) Shoe Gaga head 
Banana Grapes Oogle boo 
Spoon Cup Moley schmoley 
Doll Block Wuggy woo 
Watch Brush Gobble gook 
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Appendix C 
Scripts used to introduce communicative context of English-Humor, English-Sincere, 




E: You know, [confederate] is really funny. 
C: I love to be silly! 
E: How about we make some jokes! I’ll ask you for some things and you two 
can be silly. 
 
English-Sincere:  
E: You know, [confederate] loves to have fun. 
C: I love to play games! 
E: How about we play a game. I’m going to ask you for some things and you 
two can help me. 
 
Foreign-Humor: 
E: You know, [confederate] is really funny, and [confederate] doesn’t speak 
much English 
C: J’aime bien faire des blagues! [French] 
E: How about we make some jokes! I’ll ask you for some things and you two 
can be silly. 
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Foreign-Sincere: 
E: You know, [confederate] doesn’t speak much English 
C: J’aime bien faire des blagues! [French]/ Va a discoteca! [Italian] 
E: How about we play a game. I’m going to ask you for some things and you 




E: You know, [confederate] is really funny. 
C: I love to be silly! 
E: How about we make some jokes! I’ll ask you what some things are called 
and you two can be silly. 
 
English-Sincere:  
E: You know, [confederate] loves to have fun. 
C: I love to play games! 
E: How about we play a game. I’m going to ask you what some things are 
called and you two can help me. 
 
Foreign-Humor: 
E: You know, [confederate] is really funny, and [confederate] doesn’t speak 
much English 
C: J’aime bien faire des blagues! [French] 
E: How about we make some jokes! I’ll ask you what some things are called 
and you two can be silly. 
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Foreign-Sincere: 
E: You know, [confederate] doesn’t speak much English 
C: J’aime bien faire des blagues! [French]/ Va a discoteca! [Italian] 
E: How about we play a game. I’m going to ask you what some things are 
called and you two can help me. 
 
When either the Giving or Naming task came second, the first two lines were omitted, 
and the experimenter said the final portion of the script, except that she said, “How 
about we make some more jokes” or “How about we play another game”.
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Appendix D 
Coding Scheme for the Naming Task 
1. Correct 
a. The exact same word, e.g., calls elephant, “Elephant” 
b. Mispronounced correct word (drops syllable, mispronounces 
phoneme), e.g., calls elephant, “elphant”, calls banana, “nana”, calls 
grapes, “gwapes” 
c. A correct synonym or category, e.g., calls doll, “baby”, calls diaper, 
“pull-up”, calls elephant, “animal”, calls banana, “fruit” 
d. Describes by correct color: e.g., calls elephant, “grey”, calls banana, 
“yellow” 
e. Describes by correct noise, e.g., calls duck, “quack”, calls watch, “tick-
tock” 
 
2. Incorrect  
a. Incorrect word, e.g., calls elephant, “monkey”, calls spoon, “shirt” 
b. Says silly word, e.g., calls shoe, “moogy” 
c. Plays with real word by repeating it, rhyming it, adding extra sounds or 
words, e.g., calls cup “cup cup”, calls brush “brushy goo”, calls banana 
“lip stick banana” 
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Appendix E 
Results for Giving and Naming Tasks using ANOVA on children’s percentage of 
incorrect responses.  
 
Preliminary analyses found no effect of Gender or Age, so these were dropped 
from the final analyses. 
Giving 
Preliminary analyses found no effect of Order, so it was dropped from the 
final analysis. A 2 (Intention: Humorous, Sincere) X 2 (Language: English, Foreign) 
between-subjects ANOVA found that children were significantly more likely to give 
the incorrect object in the Humor (M = 32.44%, SD = 29.40%) than Sincere 
conditions (M = 20.79%, SD = 26.12%), F(1, 100) = 4.49, p = .037, ŋ = .043. There 
was no difference between how often children gave the incorrect object in the English 
(M = 29.25%, SD = 30.47%) and Foreign conditions, (M = 23.65%, SD = 25.74%), 
F(1, 100) = 1.08, p = .302. 
Naming 
A 2 (Intention: Humorous, Sincere) X 2 (Language: English, Foreign) X 2 
Order (Comprension task first, second) between-subjects ANOVA found that children 
were significantly more likely to produce incorrect labels in the Humor (M = 41.94%, 
SD = 38.88%) than Sincere conditions (M = 21.88%, SD = 28.95%), F(1, 73) = 4.76, 
p = .032, ŋ = .061. Children in the English conditions (M = 38.71%, SD = 36.43%) 
were significantly more likely to produce an incorrect label than children in the 
Foreign Conditions (M = 21.05%, SD = 31.16%), F(1, 73) = 5.87, p = .018, ŋ = .074. 
Children were more likely to produce an incorrect label if they did the Naming task 
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second (M = 39.09%, SD = 35.35%) instead of first (M = 22.90%, SD = 33.52%), F(1, 
73) = 4.51, p = .037, ŋ = .058. 
